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ARTICLES
A CLASH OF TWO CULTURES:
WILL THE TORT SYSTEM SURVIVE
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REFORM?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

There are two possible ways to approach the general questions of tort law.
The first is theoretical: the analyst begins with some abstract model of human
behavior, usually one that posits individuals who seek to maximize their selfinterest, and then seeks to fashion from that model the set of ideal tort rules that
seek to achieve some stated social end, most typically either corrective justice
or the minimization of the sum of the costs of accidents, their prevention and the
administrative costs necessary to operate the system. Looked at in this way, it
is possible to make a comparison between rules of negligence and strict liability,
to examine the choice between contributory negligence as an absolute defense
and comparative negligence, to probe the various formulations of proximate
cause, to ask about the optimum rules of tort damage, and, moving a bit further
from the center, to decide whether the whole tort system in any of its
permissible permutations is superior or inferior to some system of automobile
no-fault insurance, with its reliance on (mandatory) first-party insurance and
limited damage awards.
That set of issues is a fascinating and important one and it has preoccupied
academic debates over tort liability. Nonetheless it is not the subject of this
lecture. Rather, I want to take on a second and more prosaic approach to tort
liability. Thus I begin with the day to day operation of the system, and the
efforts to fund the liabilities it generates through the insurance mechanism. As
stated even this inquiry is too broad for present concerns because tort insurance,
as such, is not sold under that broad classification. Instead the market is divided
into a set of multiple lines: products, professional liability (by specialty),
. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This
lecture reflects legislative and judicial developments through the Fall of 1990, but does not take into
account those that occurred after that time.
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occupier's liability, and automobile insurance. Each of these lines has its own
special problems stemming both from the nature of the underlying risks and
from the financial and legal position of the insured population. In part the
differences across separate lines depend upon the nature of the underlying cases.
The typical issues in a medical malpractice case are likely to differ substantially
from those in a collision case, even if both malpractice and collision cases fall
at some level of abstraction under the general rubric of negligence actions.
The relevant differences extend, moreover, beyond evidentiary and
doctrinal concerns. There is a political dimension as well. Medical malpractice
is an issue of a local nature. In turn, medical malpractice insurance is sold to
a small professional group that does not command anything close to a dominant
electoral position, but which might be effective in local legislative fights.
Product liability is an issue that pits local consumers against out of state
producers, and their out of state insurers. But the purchasers of the insurance
are not heavily represented in the ranks of voters. Automobile insurance is the
one line of insurance which is subject to mass marketing within any given state,
with large numbers of out of state producers. Automobile insurance is the one
issue on which it is possible to mount an effective state wide campaign for
reform, be it through legislation as in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, or through
the referendum, as in California.'
Owing to the cumulative impact of these various differences, any
comprehensive analysis that starts with doctrine and moves through politics will
have to be cognizant of the different overall environments across different areas
of tort exposure. The issues of insurance as it related to the products and
medical malpractice issues have been extensively studied,2 as one would expect
with systems under stress. And in this paper I shall respond to a stress from
another quarter, and concentrate on the automobile line of insurance, which is
now subject to major regulatory initiatives as noted above.
Although confined to automobile insurance, the inquiry here is in its own
way a broad one, and may be divided conveniently into a number of related
parts. The first part examines the question of how the institution of insurance
is integrated into a general tort theory. The second part then examines the

1. See The Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990, 1990 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 8
(West) [hereinafter FAIRA]; 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 6 (Purdon); Proposition 103 (codified as
amended at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01-1861.16(West Supp. 1991). There was also a referendum
calling for a 20 percent rollback of automobile insurance premiums in Arizona, which failed in the
November, 1990 election. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1990 at 1, col. 1.
2. See, e.g., P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1985); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987);
Priest, Modem Tort Law and ts Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1987) (the 1986 Monsanto lecture).
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political pressures that are necessary to handle the cost of insurance through
various systems of state regulation, and the responses that the insurance industry
and the courts have made to those forms of regulation. The third part examines
the way in which the systems of regulation, especially those imposed as of late,
feed back into the deterrent and compensation functions of the tort law.
I choose this topic for two reasons. One as a general matter, I think that
the success of the tort system in achieving any of its primary social goals, moral
or economic, depends more heavily on the selection of sound regimes of
insurance regulation than it does on the "optimal" set of rules internal to the
liability system. The differences between first and second-best solutions on
matters of insurance and liability are often very small. It is a common feature
of the models developed, for example, in Professor Shavell's masterful
economic analysis of accident law, that the differences in utility levels between
various outcomes are less than one-percent3 -- figures that are swamped by
administrative costs and various forms of uncertainty. Second, the sweeping
legal changes in the institution of insurance in California, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania are too central to the operation of the tort system for automobile
accidents to be ignored. State regulation has already led to major litigation4 and
jockeying in both state and federal courts. 5 In addition, state regulation has
brought to the fore hard questions of constitutional law as they relate to the
scope of the takings, due process, and contracts clauses, insofar as these protect
the invested capital that insurance companies must place at risk in order to back
up their insurance obligations. It is all too easy to think that questions of tort
liability and insurance remain constant across different areas, when they do not.
With automobile insurance, the structure of the underlying markets has dictated
the path of reform. Yet even though many of the conclusions about this
particular exercise in social regulation are specific to one industry, broader
lessons can still be learned. Insurance reform is always perceived of as an
option to, or a companion for tort reform: the reform of medical malpractice
liability is coupled with the formation of bedpan mutuals. The alteration of
product liability law is coupled with the recognition of industry wide risk
retention groups. The interaction between the political process and the insurance
markets may take one form with automobile insurance and quite another form
with some other line of insurance, and one must be cautious about making

3. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987), ch. 8, table 8.1,
in which differences in risk aversion typically yield to outcome differences of less than one percent.
4. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fortunato, No. C-90-0085 (Mercer County Ct.
May 31, 1990)(denying a preliminary motion to enjoin enforcement of FAIRA).
5. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. The 65 Security Plan, 879 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying
an insurance company's attempt to have a state court action removed to federal court on the grounds
that the state insurance regulations were preempted by the Employer Retirement Income Security

Act).
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generalizations that are insensitive to the specific nature of given markets. The
story of legislative reform in this context is not a happy one, but there is no
guarantee that the same outcome will arise in other areas.
The charter of the Monsanto Lectures asks that one talk about deep issues
of tort reform and insurance. I do not know whether the issues that I am about
to speak of here qualify as deep, given its institutional focus. Nonetheless I
think that it is useful to follow a single dispute to its final conclusion, because
the level of institutional detail that is available on the question of automobile
insurance should be of great interest to anyone who wants to place the question
of tort liability in its broader social setting. I should also state at the outset that
I am not a disinterested bystander in the entire matter, as for the past year I
have worked (given my interest in takings, torts and insurance law) as an outside
consultant for Allstate Insurance Company in its legal struggles in California,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. But my purpose here is not to repeat the war
stories of the embattled litigant, but to examine the relationship between the
liability and the insurance market, both regulated and unregulated, with respect
to automobiles. There can be enormous dislocations in the operation of a tort
system even where its liability rules are sound, for a poor system of insurance
can undermine the desirable features of the tort law.
I. TORT, WrrH OR WITHOUT INSURANCE
The normal model of tort liability seeks at reasonable costs to induce all
automobile drivers to take precautions to minimize the level and severity of
Notwithstanding the extensive debate over
accidents that they cause. 6
negligence and strict liability, the differences between these two regimes loom
small within the context of automobile accidents. While negligence liability is
ordinarily conceived of as comparing the costs and benefits of different
precautions under the lens of the Learned Hand formula,7 practical litigation on
the highway normally dispenses with so fine-spun an inquiry and will impose
liability where a defendant has deviated from the rules of the road.' In
occasional cases there may be an exotic set of excuses -- insanity9 or
necessity'0 come most quickly to mind -- that do raise genuine intellectual
puzzles, but the infrequency of the problem means that the basic structure of the

6. For the early statement of the principles, see G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
(1970). For the most recent formal efforts to work out the arrangements, see W. LANDES & R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); S. SHAVELL, supra note 3. The later

contains an explicit formal explanation of the logic of insurance. Id. at ch. 9, 10.
7. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
8. See H. L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970).
9. See, e.g., Breunig v. American Family Ins., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970).
10. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
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system (certainly within a tolerance of one percent) is the same no matter how
these marginal cases are resolved. The big issues on negligence liability,
infancy and drunkenness do occur in many cases, but these are generally held
to be irrelevant just as if the legal system itself adopted a strict liability norm."
In the large run of cases liability is determined by application of simple rules of
thumb which in practice approach a system of strict liability, although a bit less
favorable to recovery and a bit more expensive to operate. I should switch to
the strict liability system for highway accidents if given my druthers, but regard
the change as an incremental improvement, not a fundamental shift in
orientation. (Indeed for the present tale, even the more indirect choice between
tort and no-fault systems is of minor consequence.12) There are of course
other contexts in which a shift in liability regimes, say from negligence to strict
liability or the reverse, could have far more dramatic consequences, as with
liability for bad blood, for which the negligence standard tends to insulate the
defendants for liability except in infrequent cases where customary standards are
not followed, 3 and for retailers' liability, which likewise is difficult to
establish in many areas, e.g. defective testing of dangerous drugs. 4 But in the
context of automobile liability the convergence of the two systems is powerful,
although not complete.
The liability system, however, fares no better than the resources available
to back it. And these resources are usually in short supply, at least with respect
to private passenger drivers. A serious injury on the highway is every bit as
debilitating as the identical injury sustained from the use of a defective product
or from a careless surgery. Yet the typical individual driver's total net worth
is only a tiny fraction of the harm in question and is usually insufficient to cover
lost earnings or medical expenses, let alone pain and suffering. If the sting of
the tort system is supposed to induce precautions (and that proposition holds
regardless of whether we deal with strict liability or negligence), then the
insolvent defendant cannot be made to pay the price for his mistakes, so why
take care? And if the compensation required to make the plaintiff whole (or
even to tend to wounds and losses) is not forthcoming, then the tort system fails
in its task of redress as well. Liability rules have no teeth if defendants have no
assets.

11. See, e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966).
12. See Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 769 (1980).
13. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/ §§ para. 5101-03 (1981). For a critical account of
the blood statutes, urging a return to strict liability, see, R. Eckert, The AIDS Blood Transfusion
Cases: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Liability (July 31, 1990).
14. See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (1985).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1991

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1991], Art. 2

178

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

There is, I think, a widespread agreement that this solvency problem is
potentially explosive. Fortunately, safety on the highway is not solely dependent
upon imposing financial sanctions. Three other sets of social controls are
relevant as well.
First, there are enormous investments in highway safety and automobile
design, which seek either to minimize the likelihood of an accident or its
expected severity. To the extent that one can fund these inputs through taxes
and other systems, it is possible to both reduce the level of accidents and the
need for compensation, and thereby to take some of the pressure off the tort
system. Automobile insurance companies, for example, have long been in favor
of requiring airbags,15 and they have traditionally been opposed to the
minimum mileage requirements for fleets, because smaller cars (even in
collisions with smaller cars) produce higher levels of accidents.
Second, other systems of social control also impose losses on the errant
driver, even if they do not provide compensation to the injured party. Thus a
system of licensure (or, I shall return to it later, compulsory insurance) can keep
people off the highway, and thus reduce both the frequency of accidents and
their severity. As before, protection from losses ex ante operates a substitute
for compensation ex post, and thus reduces the dollars that have to pass through
the insurance system. Similarly even people who have no money can be sent
to jail for drunk driving, reckless misconduct, just driving without a license.
The criminal law thus kicks in because it too is not hampered by a solvency
constraint, even though it is intrinsically costly for the state to operate. But lest
one be too optimistic, all offenders are not caught, and, if caught, they are not
necessarily made to suffer a severe sentence.
Third, the individual driver is not in the same position as the physician in
a malpractice case or the manufacturer in a product liability action. Reckless
or dangerous conduct that increases the risk of loss on strangers will normally
increase simultaneously the risk of loss on the driver and passengers in a car.
The diminution of life's pleasures looms large even for a driver with a tiny bank
account. The need for self-protection (or protection of one's one car or house)
thus induces persons to take precautions that in the broad run of cases inure for
the benefit of strangers as well: driving slower is in a sense a public good,
because it protects the driver and pedestrian alike. A person who runs the risk
of a crippling injury himself is apt to be a bit more careful than a person who
knows that he is invulnerable to loss no matter how he drives. So the instinct
of survival leads many people not to run red lights, even if they are judgment-

15. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (pitting
the insurance companies against the automobile companies who resisted mandatory rules for their
installation all through the 1980s).
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proof. Yet here the self-protection proxy is again imperfect, for public goods,
even though they are produced are usually underproduced.' 6 And some type
of precautions do not operate like public goods; they may help the actor more
than an outside victim. It is very easy to kill or maim a pedestrian in an
accident that leaves the driver of an automobile unhurt, especially if the driver
takes a (separable) precaution of wearing seatbelts, which if anything might
induce faster or less attentive driving. 7 There are then imperfect ways to
cover the gap between what the tort system provides and what is needed to
secure prudent conduct on the highway.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these three regulatory
mechanisms, taken together, are powerful enough to obviate the need for any
system of tort liability. The current organization of the system reflects the
common judgment that compensation from the wrongdoer to the victim forms
at least a part of the overall picture; the liability of the defendant is a deterrent,
and vesting the right to compensation with the injured party increases the
likelihood that it will be imposed. The tort system then remains part of the
overall strategy of accident prevention. But in order for tort liability to do its
job, there typically has to be insurance for otherwise a judgment proof defendant
is totally outside the scope of the tort system. Yet the very act of providing
insurance helps to insulate the driver of the car from the consequences of his
action, for now someone else has to foot the bill for the negligence. The effort
to secure compensation dulls the incentives to take care, and many of the early
discussions of the enforceability of insurance contracts for third party liability
turned on this moral hazard question. 8
That the reduction in expected liability will yield to an increase in expected
losses is surely one feature of the liability system, for it is well established that
the built-in moral hazard situation (I act, you pay) always threatens to undermine
insurance contracts, and it becomes critical to understand what, if anything, is
an optimal response to it.' 9 In part the insurance company relies upon the
three features mentioned above (highway and car design, licensure and criminal

16. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
17. On which see Peltzman, The Effects ofAutomobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677
(1975).
18. See the exhaustive debate on the subject in Breeden v. Frankford Marine, Accident& Plate
Glass Ins. Co., 220 Mo. 327, 119 S.W. 576 (1909), which is analyzed elaborately in Schwartz, The
Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313 (1990).
19. See Schwartz, supra note 18, n. 118, noting genuine instances of moral hazard: obtaining
insurance against the costs of strike induced the baseball owners to take a tougher stand in
negotiation; the insurance made available to pay for the lavish expenditures that Japanese golfers are
by custom obliged to provide their business associates induced caddies and golfers to collude in
claiming falsely that holes-in-one had been made. More centrally, the presence of health insurance
can induce high levels of use of the health services.
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liability, and risk of injury to one's own person and property) to reduce the
likelihood of injury enough for its (reduced) premium to cover its expected
payouts. In part an insurance company relies upon a fourth feature that is easy
to overlook. The existence of any system of liability insurance does not fully
insulate the insured party from the consequences of his own negligence. The
private assets, if any, of the insured still provide an "excess" layer of insurance
over the primary levels of insurance afforded by the carrier. As reckless
conduct tends to increase the severity as well as the frequency of accidents, the
insured has some incentive to take care that its conduct does not generate losses
that spillover the level of protection obtained, at least if there are assets worth
protecting.
These multiple factors taken together, however, do not allow an insurance
company to be indifferent to its book of business or to its premium rates.
Underwriting and rate selection are essential tools for insurer self-protection.
A bad book of business at insufficient prices is a sure way to go bankrupt in the
short run, notwithstanding the comfort of the occasional bull market. Insurance
companies do more than jealously contest liability and damages after the accident
occurs. For their own protection they must also select their insureds, and their
level of exposures for those insureds. With some lines of coverage the effective
control on risk can come after the insurance policy is written. Thus where
insurance companies write boiler insurance or premises insurance, a huge
portion of the premium goes to the inspection of boilers to see that they do not
misfunction. Similarly, premises insurance is designed to cover the losses
associated with the present condition of the premises, which insurance
companies can then inspect with relative ease.'
But with certain lines of
insurance, most notably automobile, there is little that an insurance company can
do to monitor its insureds when they are driving on the highway. Of necessity
insurer efforts to control risk must take place earlier in the process, most
critically in the selection of whom they will insure and the rates that they
charge.
In so doing, insurance companies act may be motivated by their own selfinterest, but the consequences of that self-interest redound to the benefit of the
public at large--at least, and it will become a very big if, if obtaining some level
of liability insurance is made an explicit condition for using the public highway,
if in other words there is in place a system of compulsory insurance. 2 If

20. But they are unwilling to assume tort liability for negligent inspection, and typically contract
out from it, see Stacy v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 484 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1973), or are

protected by statute. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, par. 138.5(a) (1989).
21. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925), sustaining
the power of the state to condition a license to use public highways on the condition of obtaining
insurance.
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insurance companies insist that bad drivers pay very high premiums, it creates
a powerful incentive for individuals to become good drivers in order to reduce
their own costs. They will take driver education classes, better maintain their
own cars, and drive with greater caution than they otherwise would. Those
actions of course reduce risks to other motorists and pedestrians, and thus have
an external social benefit as well. Similarly, if an insurance company (or all
insurance companies) decline to take a risk, they have done a social service as
well, so long as the disappointed applicant is no longer able to drive.' By
keeping the worst drivers off the highway, insurance reduces the levels of
fatalities, injuries and property damage below what they would otherwise be,
and reduces the premiums that other drivers have to pay for their uninsured, or
underinsured motorist coverage.'
The monitoring and underwriting of the insurer, then, operates as a
functional substitute for the incentives that the tort system imposes on all
drivers, or at least that the tort system would impose upon them, if they were
all solvent. The mere fact that so many drivers are insolvent, or practically so,
suggest that the usual relationship between insurance and deterrence is inverted.
When there is no liability insurance, there is a smaller deterrent for insolvent or
poor drivers than when the liability insurance is in place. Insurance substitutes
insurer monitoring for tort liability as the source of compliance with social
norms. Where the tort liability is weak, the substitution is that more likely to
produce appropriate levels of care, for a driver that faces the risk of higher
premiums at renewal, and the risk of getting no renewal at all, will have a
greater incentive to take care.
There is indeed a sense in which the insurance companies are not a perfect
surrogate for the social concerns. The insolvency constraints that make it
impossible for ordinary drivers to pay for serious accidents also operate at a
lower level to constrain the market for insurance. The family with an income
of $50,000 per year cannot afford to spend all its income on insurance, or even

22. It is thus critical that there be a powerful system of sanctions against these drivers, for
otherwise the mix of drivers on the road will not improve because insurers refuse to cover risks.
It is an open question of what percentage of risky drivers who are refused coverage under an
assigned risk plan, or cannot afford the coverage afforded under the plan, continue to drive without
insurance. There is some reason to believe that these numbers will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. It is certainly the case that the number of uninsured drivers on the highways continues
to increase apace, and so too with the number of underinsured drivers. See generally, A. WIDISS,
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE (1985).
23. Accident frequency depends both on what an individual driver does and on what others on
the road do. A safe driver on a road populated with a group of reckless drivers has a higher rate
of accidents (and will exercise a higher rate of diligence) than the same driver on a road populated
with a group of equally careful drivers. Controlling the mix of drivers is of critical social
importance.
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a large fraction of it. The level of coverages that are required of drivers
typically therefore are far lower than those which would be necessary to provide
adequate compensation and deterrence in a first best world. In deciding whether
it is good or bad for Jones to drive, the right question that the system has to ask
is what is the comparative costs and benefits of letting Jones on the highway or
keeping him off. If there is a one percent chance that Jones will cause a million
dollar injury to someone this year, then the appropriate cost of personal liability
insurance to Jones for driving (ignoring everything else) should be $10,000.'
But if Jones only has to purchase insurance for $100,000 in losses, then the
premium charged by the insurance company as a first approximation will be
$1,000, and Jones will drive if he can pay that amount. When the accident
occurs, the insurer liability at $100,000 is funded by the premium, but the social
loss is (at least) ten times greater. It follows therefore that the major difficulty
of a system of insurer scrutiny of driving risk is that it is not stringent enough.
More precisely an insurer will take into account fully small risks covered by the
policy, but will ignore those parts of the large risks that are above the policy
limits. Their other sanctions mentioned above still have to kick in; yet even
though they do, a well-functioning system of insurance may well leave too many
drivers on the road.
At this point the case for stringent driver licensing (initially and by
revocation) becomes still more powerful because the ability to obtain insurance
up to some specified level does not provide complete assurance that a bad driver
will internalize the costs of hurting another individual. To make the point clear,
simply substitute for the phrase "risky driver" the phrase "operator of a nuclear
power plant." These plants with current levels of risk could easily obtain
insurance at quite substantial levels, say even several billion dollars through
adroit syndication and reinsurance. Yet not even the most ardent defender of
markets and nuclear power would take the position that once the private market
generates insurance (even guarding against the risk that the insurance company
could go belly up) that the license to operate the plant should be issued as a
matter of course. The risks (e.g. the classic meltdown) that might come to pass
are far in excess of those limits, so the insurance obtainable is rightly regarded
only as a minimum condition for an operating license, and not as a sufficient

24. There is a further complication that I ignore here.

The million dollar judgment is the

amount of damages awarded ex post. It need not (often will not be) the same sum of money needed
to bring the plaintiff back to the same level of utility enjoyed before the accident occurred.

For

parties in an injured state, the diminishing utility of money (at least after some certain stage) is so
great that no amount of money will restore the plaintiff to the prior level of utility. If so, then
whatever number is fixed by the tort system for solvent defendants still is below the level of the true
social losses. The problem is independent of the one in the text, but reinforces the difficulty. On
the implications of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth on selecting damage levels, see
Friedman, Wat is 'FairCompensation'forDeath or Injury?, 2 INT'L. REV. OF L. & ECON. 81
(1982).
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condition. Direct forms of safety standards, reviews and inspections are without
question an essential part of the overall picture, and the only real debate is the
exact form that these ought to take.' In principle this argument carries over
to automobile drivers as well. The smaller risks of mayhem are counterbalanced
by the smaller resources, even with insurance, to counter them.

II.

ASSIGNED RISK

POOLS:

THE INSURER AS COMMON CARRIER

As a matter of theory, it has been established that insurance against losses
wrongfully caused should not be a sufficient condition for the award of a
driver's license, taking into account the chances of small, but catastrophic risks
that their conduct can impose upon others. But while nuclear power plants do
not vote, potential drivers and their families do, and their pressures are exerted
at every stage of the political process. Licenses are not all that hard to acquire
in the first instance, even for drivers in high risk groups, but they are not easily
suspended or revoked, even after a history of serious accidents.' The political
pressures are such that once the legal system imposes a requirement that there
be compulsory insurance, it then raises the expectation that all licensed insurers
are common carriers under an obligation "to take all comers" at a risk, even if
they in their underwriting discretion would choose to turn it down.27 While the
basic theory of deterrence suggests that the willingness to provide insurance is
not a sufficient condition to grant a license, in practice the ability to obtain
limited automobile liability insurance in a voluntary market is not even a
necessary condition for obtaining a license. Instead one of the dominant features
of the insurance system is the assigned risk pool, whereby certain classes of
eligible drivers are awarded insurance coverage at prices below what the
insurance company would demand for the insured level of risk, and a fortiori
below the level of insurance necessary to cover the full risks that the driving
would impose upon the public at large.'

25. A discussion of the current regulatory scheme is found in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59 (1978) upholding the Price-Anderson Act, 71 Stat.
576, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 with its damage limitation provisions, and describing the overall system of
nuclear power regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Act of August 30, 1954, ch. 1073,
68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1970 ed. and Supp. V).
26. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
27. See FAIRA, supra note 1,§ 27.
28. The basic mandate of the California Assigned Risk Pool reads as follows:
The commissioner, after a public hearing, shall approve or issue a reasonable plan
for the equitable apportionment, among insurers admitted to transact liability insurance,
of those applicants for automobile bodily injury and property damage liability insurance
who are in good faith entitled to but are unable to procure such insurance through
ordinary methods.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11620 (West 1988).
On the meaning of "in good faith entitled" to insurance, see infra note 34.
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The actual operation of an assigned risk pool is tricky business because of
the built-in shortfall between the premium charged and the risk that is covered.
Since assigned risk pool business is losing business, no insurer will voluntarily
undertake to insure it. Therefore some mechanism has to be developed at the
state level to decide who will take which risks. The standard statutory response
is to assign the risks by rotation, taking care to see that insurers are not required
to enter into new lines of insurance or to write business in territories in which
they do not participate in the voluntary market.' Thereafter the assignments
are made so that the amount of business that one has to take in the assigned risk
pool are roughly proportionate to the share of business that the insurance
company has in the voluntary market. 30
This use of this scheme of assignment is critical for the ability to maintain
a stable relationship between the voluntary and the assigned risk portions of the
market. To see why this is the case, assume that the losses associated with an
assigned risk pool were treated as a fixed charge ($X dollars per year) against
the income of any insurance company, wholly without regard to the amount of
automobile insurance that it wrote or continues to write within the state. At that
point there would be no way in which the insurers could recapture any portion
of the assigned risk pool losses in the highly competitive, unregulated voluntary
market. 3 Thus suppose that a firm with a fixed bill of $1,000,000 in the

29. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2445.1(a) (1991), which provides in relevant part:
"Insofar as possible, assignments shall be consistent with the scope of operations and underwriting
policies of each insurer, of which the Manager shall have been notified in writing." Id.
30. See CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 10, § 2430 (1991), which provides in relevant part:
As a prerequisite to consideration for assignment under the Plan an applicant must
certify, in the prescribed application form, that he has attempted, within sixty days prior
to the date of application to obtain automobile bodily injury and property damage
liability insurance in the State and that he has been unable to obtain such insurance
through ordinary methods. An applicant so certifying shall be considered for assignment
upon making application in good faith to the Plan. An applicant shall be considered in
good faith if he reports all information of the material nature and does not willfully
make incorrect or misleading statements in the prescribed application form, or does not
come within any of the prohibitions or exclusions listed below.
Id.; CAL. CODE RFus. tit. 10, § 2445(a) (1991) which provides in relevant part:
The manager shall assign the risks which are eligible for assignment in such
sequence and number that, as far as practicable, each insurer shall in the long run be
given that number of assignments which will develop automobile liability premiums
bearing to the total automobile liability premiums developed on all assignments, the
same ratio as the insurer's net direct automobile liability premiums in California bear
to the total net direct automobile liability premium writings in California of all insurers.
Id.
31. Note that the insurance industry in California has some 3,600 different firms. See Zycher,
Automobile Insurance Regulation, Direct Democracy, and the Interests of Consumers, REGULATION
67, 73 (Summer, 1990). The extensive use of brokers makes it relatively easy for consumers to
obtain comparative quotations for coverage.
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assigned risk pool believes that it will write 10,000 policies in the voluntary
market. It therefore would have to charge $100 per policy to cover its assigned
risk losses. But the moment it includes that cost component in its rates, another
company will realize that it can rake off additional business by asking for only
$50 from each customer in the voluntary market toward its assigned risk losses.
But faced with a loss of all recoupment, the first firm will seek only $25 until
the premium is quickly bid down to zero.
Stated more technically, making the losses from the assigned risk pool a
fixed charge on the business of an insurance company has no effect on its
business decisions at the margin. Whatever prices maximized its profits before
the fixed charged was imposed will continue to maximize its profits thereafter.
The profits will be reduced by the full amount of the charge, just as if it were
the payment of an unrelated tax or tort judgment. The long term position in the
industry is therefore for some firms to exit because the combined rate of return
from the voluntary and assigned risk markets is below the competitive rate of
return on capital in some other line of endeavor. 32 That in turn puts greater
pressure on the remaining firms that have to absorb larger shares of the assigned
risk pool.
We have of course had assigned risk pools in insurance for well over fifty
years, and automobile insurance markets have not yet collapsed. The reason is
that the costs of writing business in the assigned risk pool are not fixed but
variable. The standard formula, set out above, in effect provides that the more
business that is written in the voluntary market, the larger fraction of the
assigned risk that must be taken. Each firm knows therefore that as it expands
its scope of business it will be saddled with more of the loss -- a kind of
perverse return for excellence. Once the assigned risk pool are parcelled out in
this matter, the market should exhibit certain stabilizing features, for this tied
price structure precludes the possibility that the necessary premium in the
voluntary market will be bid down to zero, and it is important to note why.
The explanation goes as follows. So long as the share for each firm in the
assigned risk market is fixed, anything it gets in the voluntary market will
reduce that loss resulting in the predictable cycle of bidding down the surplus
through competition. But if the share of the assigned risk market is tied to the

32. This discussion presupposes that it is costless to exit. In New Jersey FAIRA contains
provisions that allow the Commissioner to order the exiting firm to continue to pay additional sums
for past losses, and to surrender its licenses on other unrelated lines of business. If valid, these
provisions effectively limit the exit option, and allow the state to confiscate a substantial portion of
the insurance company's assets through regulation. Indeed even where there are no legal restraints
or taxes on exit, the option is still costly, for it is no easy business to disentangle oneself from a
myriad of ongoing obligations to insureds, landlord's, employees, pension funds and the like.
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fraction of the voluntary market, then getting more business in the voluntary
increases the costs to the carrier, for each new customer. The assigned risk
pool obligation is no longer a fixed cost of doing business. It becomes a
variable cost that has to be taken into account with each new policy that is
written. To compensate for those variable costs, the carrier will have to price
each of its policies in the voluntary market at a level that reflects the new
exposure that it simultaneously incurs in the assigned risk market. If for each
10 policies in the voluntary market, the insurer gets an additional one in the
assigned risk market, then a $1,000 loss per assigned risk policy translates into
an implicit $100 tax on each policy in the voluntary market. The insurance firm
therefore must price its voluntary policies to take into account that tax on
additional sales, just as it takes into account any premium or other excise tax
that is levied on the business that it does. As a first approximation, the
voluntary market remains stable and can generate sufficient gains to offset the
losses in the assigned risk market. As a kind of an added bonus, if the size of
the voluntary sector increases, then the actual burden of writing any individual
policy should be reduced at the margin.
It should not, however, be supposed that all is well with this system, for
there are corrosive effects of this strategy for controlling assigned risks that have
to be taken into account as well even in stable political environments. A tax
(even if disguised as an obligation to assume losing business) creates a wedge
between the amount that the seller of the good or service receives, and the costs
that are paid. The former figure is always lower than the latter. In effect
buyers of insurance act as though, for example, the cost is $600 while sellers
respond as if the amount received is $500. It follows therefore that in those
cases where the insurance would be available on mutually satisfactory terms for
any figure between $500 and $600, the market will break down, as the seller
will not supply at $500 (plus the tax of $100) the insurance at a price the buyer
(under $600) will pay. 33 It follows therefore that some additional individuals
(who "in good faith are entitled to insurance in the voluntary market," i.e.
without the tax) will be thrown into the assigned risk pool because of the
presence of this implicit tax, and this will in turn increase the amount of the tax
that has to be provided. It also follows that the profitability of the insurance
business will be reduced, as is the case with all taxes. Nonetheless, it is clear
that if the levels of participation in the assigned risk pool are limited, as by rules
that require insureds to seek out coverage in the voluntary market,' and if the
rates in that pool are kept high enough, then it is possible for both the voluntary
and the assigned risk markets to be maintained at least in the short run, which

33. The point is but another illustration of the familiar problem of the resource loss caused by
the "excess burden" of taxation. See generally, J. GWARTNEY & R. STROUP, ECONOMICS, PUBUC
AND PRIVATE CHOICE 110-1 1(4th ed. 1987).
34. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2430 (1991), supra note 30.
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is an outcome that is not possible if insurance companies that were assigned
assumed a fixed fraction of the assigned risk pool debt.
There is, however, a structural risk that has to be taken into account as
well, and in hard times it will (and has) proved enormous. The argument above
assumed that the amount of loss for each policy in the assigned risk pool was a
constant, so that firms with large books of business could estimate with a fair
degree of precision their expected liabilities and respond to them accordingly.
But the rates in the assigned risk pool are not set by private agreement, but
rather by state fiat, and the size of the membership in the assigned risk pool may
well vary with state regulations and underwriting practices. If the swings in a
given year are great, then bad forecasting could result in substantial assigned
risk pool losses that are not made up in the voluntary market.
The long term risk has immediate consequences for the behavior of
insurance companies. Even if the piling on does not take place in each year, the
risk of it can never be ignored. Insurance companies cast a watchful eye on
their assigned risk burden, and have a strong incentive not to expand their
customer base in any jurisdiction where the assigned risk pool liability could be
increased through regulatory intervention.
The upshot therefore is that
regulation of the assigned risk pool sector can reduce the amount of competition
in the unregulated sector, leading to a deterioration of price and quantity. The
potential effects of regulation thus lead to a reduction in the price and quality of
service, and for a call for further regulation.
The California situation is instructive of the nature of these persistent risks.
Between 1983 and 1989, there were five hefty requests for rate increases in
California, which were largely or completely denied.35 At the same time there
were massive increases in the number of new applicants into the assigned risk
pool,' given that the rates were kept systematically below those in the

35. The tabular form of the data reads as follows:
Request Date
% Requested
% Authorized
Effective Date
April, 1983
33.7
8.4
March, 1984
July, 1984
15.0 + 15.01
13.9
January, 1985
May, 1985
62
10.7
February, 1987
December, 1986
25.0 + 25.0
18.5
December, 1987
February, 1989
112.3
denied
in litigation
Single request for two increases over a six-month period.
Taken from Zycher, supra note 31. (His table is taken from LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby, & McRae).
36. The relevant numbers as follows:
Year
Dollars (000)
Percentage Change
94.4
1983
1984
136.7
44.8
1985
329.3
140.9
1986
323.8
(1.7)
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voluntary market.37 The net effect was substantial losses in the assigned risk
market, as the deficit increased from $30 million in 1983 to about $600 million
in 1989,' and the overall rate of return on the entire book of business reduced
sharply over that period. The problems on the rating side were compounded by
the ever-increasing costs in the essential components of the basic coverage for
both property damage and bodily injury.39
Insurance is, moreover, no protection against either the regulatory or the
cost risk. Any carrier therefore that has a large share of the market may find
that it has not charged enough in the voluntary market to handle these
unexpected swings in the assigned risk pool. Insurance works as a mechanism
to overcome risk aversion where there are independent and uncorrelated
risks,' but it cannot discharge that useful social function where systematic
changes in the legal rules and cost structure effect all risks in the same fashion.
Now its dominant effect is exactly the opposite. Insurance reduces the level of
risk diversification below that which would be obtained if no one had any
insurance.
There is another criticism applicable to the present method of funding the
assigned risk pool. If there is some social determination that risky drivers
should be left on the highways, then why should the cost of that decision
(already concealed by insufficient levels of insurance) be further buried by
building the cost into the premiums charged in the voluntary market? A simpler
way to handle this question is to pass a direct financial appropriation, funded by
general tax revenues, which pays to insurance companies a figure equal to the
difference between the premium paid by the private buyer, and the amounted
demand by the insurance carrier. 4 Or if that proposal turns out to be too
difficult to implement in practice, it becomes possible for the state to make a

1987
425.7
31.5
1988
781.2
83.5
1989
1,233.4
57.9
37. During 1990, there has been some stabilization in the new applications to the assigned risk
pool in California because CAARP has been allowed to demand certification that new applicants
were turned down in the voluntary market within the past 60 days. See supra note 34. But the
underlying problem still exists, given that the voluntary market has higher rates than the CAARP
market.
The regulatory implications of the problem are discussed infra notes 66-74 and
accompanying text.
38. Zycher, supra note 31, at 69.
39. See Zycher, supra note 31, at 67-68.
40. For the a discussion of the point, see Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in
Private Insurance Markets, 13 L. STUD. 517, 536 (1984).
41. I have made the same proposals for insurance for AIDS patients, and for compensating
landlords for rent control. See, Epstein, AIDS, Testing and the Workplace, 1988 U. CHI. L.
FORUM, 33, 50-56; Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory ofEfficient Regulation, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 741, 750-55 (1988). The same suggestion is made by Justice Scalia in Pennell v City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1988).
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direct payment of $X million per year to insurance carriers in order that they
write so many assigned risk policies at stipulated rates for a given period. The
business goes to the company that makes the lowest bid. Finally, the state can
run the assigned risk pool itself (with disastrous results), as the New Jersey
experience reveals.42
All of these alternative financing systems have one common feature that the
traditional assigned risk pool lacked. They force the cost of subsidizing high
driving risks into the political system where they must be taken explicitly into
account. It is always easier to make A subsidize B than to provide that subsidy
to B out of your own pocket. Likewise, it is always easier for legislators to
force the costs on out-of-state businesses than the pass them back to their own
electorate. Making decisionmakers bear the cost always has desirable, and
sobering political consequences. But this desirable structural feature of any
funding system has been its political undoing. It is not possible within ordinary
legislative politics to transform an inchoate obligation into a direct tax
liability.43 But if the direct method is unsalable, then why should one wish,
from a social perspective, to adopt other systems that conceal the true costs (and
the true losses) associated with liability systems?
The total cost of the insurance is always a powerful concern because of the
solvency constraints noted above, and the stability of the voluntary markets is
compounded by the drag imposed upon them in the assigned risk pools. There
have been strong, even violent, political responses to the rates that have been
charged in both the voluntary and assigned risk markets. These rates have for
the most part been set in highly competitive markets, and there has been no
evidence that any insurance companies have earned any super-normal rate of
return on their automobile lines."4 Nonetheless, various forms of direct
regulation have been tried to cap overall cost in both the voluntary and assigned
risk markets, and it is instructive to review what has happened to them here.
Indeed it can be said that in New Jersey and in California, the proper treatment
of the assigned risk pool is one of the major pieces in the current wave of
automobile insurance legislation. In both cases a fair bit of institutional detail
must be set out before the legal and economic issues can be fully understood.
New Jersey. The situation in New Jersey is both dramatic and explosive.
New Jersey is by population one of the densest states in the union, and its

42. See infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
43. Governor Florio's popularity in New Jersey has dropped, and other democratic candidates
for office within the state have largely shunned him, in large part because he raised taxes within the
state to fund education and other parts of his extensive reform agenda. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 3,
1990 at 27 col. 3.
44. Over the past few years in California, for example, the rate of return on insurance within
the state has averaged 11.2 percent.
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insurance rates have long been the at or near the highest in the nation. With
high rates and a strong tradition of rate regulation, the proper treatment of the
assigned risk pool and its anticipated losses has been an item of the highest
priority. Before 1983, the assigned risk pool required that various high-risk
drivers be apportioned among the insurers that did business within the state, but
the market was unstable; several major insurers had left the state, and assigned
risks were becoming ever harder to place. In 1983, the New Jersey state
legislature responded to this problem by creating for automobile insurance a
state wide Joint Underwriting Association that was to undertake the direct
writing on assigned risk policies itself.' Under the provisions of the statute,
the insurance carriers doing business in the state were kept on as "servicing
carriers," who by contract were obliged to handle the paperwork with respect
to parties coming into the assigned risk pool, and in the processing and paying
out of claims, for which the companies were paid fees, based on the size of the
premium collected or the settlement made.' The insurance risk, however, was
left explicitly with the state. The statute provided that
No member company shall be liable for any losses, loss
adjustment expenses, claims, or expenses of any kind incurred by or
on behalf of the [JUA] The [JUA] shall have no power to impose
such liability upon any member company by means of fees,
assessments, or any other claim on the member company's income,
4 7
assets or surplus.
The contracts between the individual carriers and the JUA reflected the
underlying legal position by providing that the carrier "shall have no individual
liability for claims or policies written by or on behalf of the [JUA]." The JUA
was operated by a Board of Directors who, with the exception of an ex officio
member, received their appointments from the Governor, the Speaker of the
Assembly, or the President of the Senate. The decisions made by that Board
was then reviewed by the Commissioner of Insurance who had the power to
approve or override it, a conscious feature of institutional design that consigned
the panel to a powerful, but nonetheless, advisory role. The statute also
provided that the JUA was charged with developing appropriate standards for
setting up "actuarially sound reserves" sufficient to account for both present and
future claims (i.e. for incurred but not reported losses)' and the entire
operation was to be run on a "no loss, no profit" basis.49 The revenues to
fund the JUA were to come from two sources, first the premiums charged to
drivers insured by the JUA and second from a residual market equalization

45. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E (West Supp. 1990).
46. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1990 at BI, col. 2 (providing an outline of the system).
47. JUA Plan of Operation, Art. Vi, 1 3.
48. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-7(r) (West 1985).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-3(o) (West Supp. 1990).
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charge (the so-called RMEC) which could be imposed as a separate tax on
drivers who were insured in the voluntary market. 5° As the it was quite clear
from the outset that the premiums charged in the assigned risk market would
have to fall short of covering all losses and expenses (for otherwise the
voluntary market would continue to operate), the RMEC had to be a part of the
system. The statute also authorized that the Commissioner imposed the RMEC
if there was any loss existing within the system, and to increase that RMEC if
the losses (as determined by reports filed by the JUA Board of Directors)
continued."' The Commissioner, over the objection of the board, refused to
levy a RMEC when the first losses in the system were reported in 1985, and he
was able to win a proceeding in the Superior Court52 which allowed (in
apparent conflict with the statute) the Commissioner not to impose the RMEC
so long as the pool was able to pay off its current debts. All future losses from
past years were therefore unfunded, and it was only a matter of time before
those losses poured in without the resources to meet them. If the normal
standards of insurance accounting applied to the New Jersey assigned risk pool,
it was in essence born in insolvency. As the political and economic pressures
mounted, the Commissioner relented and imposed the RMEC, albeit in
insufficient amounts in 1988, equal to about $225 per car. But the initial
shortfall was never negated by the subsequent assessments.
Small differences in institutional design had enormous consequences for the
operation of the assigned risk pool system. In the ordinary assigned risk pool,
individual carriers have every incentive to build the assigned risk losses into the
price they charge in the voluntary market.5 3 But with the RMEC, a political
decision had to be made by the insurance commissioner to reach the same effect.
Deferring the RMEC was politically preferable, and so the deficits became
inevitable. By the time of the Fair Automobile Insurance Act of 1990, pushed
through the legislature by recently elected Governor Florio, the JUA had an
accumulated debt of some $3.5 billion, which had to be paid off by someone
somehow.
FAIRA imposed a welter of restrictions on the way in which insurance was
to be sold within New Jersey. A special 5 percent surtax was added to the cost
of insurance, and the statute contained a specific injunction that it could not be
passed through to customers.'
In addition, FAIRA levied a $900 million
special assessment against the former members of the JUA to reduce the prior

50. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-8(b) (West Supp. 1990).
51. Id.
52. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Gluck, No. A-4870-84TI (N. J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 107 N.J. 41, 526 A.2d 133 (1986).
53. See supra pp. 13-14.
54. See FAIRA, supra note 1, § 78 ("The Commissioner of Insurance shall take such action
as is necessary to ensure that private passenger automobile insurance policyholders shall not pay for
the surtax imposed pursuant to section 76 of this 1990 amendatory and supplementary act.").
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shortfall. The justification afforded for the charge was that the servicing
carriers had made that amount in "overcharges" attributable to its
"mismanagement."" The statute did not impose these charges direct against
the companies but instead constituted them as a loan to the New Jersey
Automobile Insurance Guaranty Fund, without obligation to be repaid, against
the New Jersey Property-Liability Guaranty Association, which all automobile
insurance writers are required to join.' The statute also provides that any
insurance company that wishes to cease doing automobile business within the
state "may" be required by the Insurance Commissioner to surrender its license
to write any other line of insurance (e.g. homeowners) within the state,57 a
threat which when directed to the Hartford Insurance Company persuaded them
to continue to write automobile insurance within the state in order to be allowed
to continue to write its far larger and more profitable pension and health
insurance. m
The legal challenges that have been brought against this portion of the
statute by the covered insurers have centered around two related ideas: the
impairment of contract and the taking of property without just compensation or
due process of law.59 The basic argument with respect to the $908 assessment
is that it flies in the teeth of the original agreement under the 1983 statute in
which the servicing carriers were ostensibly insulated from the losses incurred
by the JUA. By imposing the tax, New Jersey has rewritten the terms of its

55. See FAIRA, supra note 1, § 21(a) which makes these findings in the body of the statute.
56. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A-6 (West 1985).
57. See FAIRA, supra note 1, §§ 71, 72.
58. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1990 at B1, col. 2 (The Hartford wrote $17 million in auto
insurance and $308 million in other coverage).
59. In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v Fortunato, No. C-90-0085, slip op. at 6-11 (Mercer County
Ct. May 31, 1990), the Court rejected any facial constitutional challenges. The relevant passage
reads as follows:
That there is to be no liability on the insurance policies of the JUA by the
servicing carriers is of no doubt. See Bidnick v. Hanover Ins. Co., Inc., 230 N.J.
Super. 111, 115 (App. Div. 1989). But should the State be permitted to break its word
when their appears to be a financial gain, to its self-interest? Whether or not the JUA
is a "state agency," the express terms of the agreement and the enabling statute led the
servicing carriers, like plaintiff, to agree to service the JUA policies. If they
overcharged while servicing the JUA, the Commissioner can seek to recover the
overcharges he can prove. But the JUA was to operate on a no gain, no loss basis, and
each insurance company was to collect the RMEC [Residual Market Equalization
Charge] funds from its customers in order to make up any JUA losses. By changing the
methodology of offsetting losses, FAIRA operates retroactively and says that the State's
prior representations in that regard were meaningless. Is this basically unfair and
uncontitutional pursuant to the rule of United States Trust Co. [of New Yor* v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).] This court thinks not.
Id. at 6-7. The opinion then explains that the state can nullify its contracts so long as it promises
the carriers "a fair rate of profit." The feasibility of that argument is examined infra notes 59-60
and accompanying text. The basic test of United States Trust is "whether such an impairment is
'reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." Id. at 3.
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own contract, unless it could show that insurer mismanagement of underwriting
and claims (instead of underfunding) was the source of the programmatic loss.
But that finding (which seems hard to believe on the facts) would require a
separate proof against each individual carrier, and there is no obvious reason to
believe that the errors, if any, made by one carrier were of the same severity
and magnitude made by any other carrier. In any event, if the state brought its
claim as an ordinary breach of contract action, the entire matter would be
subject proofs of the sort that were not involved in the "legislative findings" that
accompanied the legislation.
One possible way to avoid the problem of contractual impairment is to
argue that the assessment should not be linked to past performance under the
JUA, but rather that it is a special tax imposed on the industry wholly without
regard to past contractual performance. Emancipating the tax increase for past
industry performance, however, only increases the returns to, and hence the
scope of, factional conduct, for now the tax could be set for any amount at all,
including sums larger than the $900 sought in the present assessment, without
even trying to "show cause" by linking the assessment to some past industry
abuse.
Yet here the answer (at least in a world of fairly strong constitutional
protection) is that the theory of taxation must be integrated with the general
theory of regulation. If it is a constitutional norm that rate regulation requires
the regulated entity to recover a just return on its invested capital,' then it
cannot be the case that this requirement can be circumvented by granting rates
at the permissible level only to subject to revenues so collected under the rate
order to a special assessment that is not borne by any other industry. To
tolerate that combination of taxing and regulatory policies is to authorize the
state to take with one hand what it is required to give with the other, and to
render pointless the constitutional protections against confiscation. The rate of
return could be calculated at 100 percent in a fit of constitutional generosity only
to be undermined by a 99 percent special tax which leads a net rate of return of
1 percent to the regulated industry. The only way to avoid that one/two punch
is to prevent special assessments from being levied against the regulation
industry, which can be made to pay only those taxes that are collected from
other business entities within the state, on a general nondiscriminatory basis.
At some level it appears that New Jersey recognizes that it cannot ignore
its constitutional obligation to provide its regulated insureds with a just rate of
return. The issue therefore turns to the way in which this constitutional
obligation is discharged. The simplest approach is to separate the losses from
previous years from its present business, and to fund them separately by taxes

60. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas,
320 U.S. 591 (1944); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
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raised out of general revenues. 6 That approach, however, was rejected in the
FAIRA legislation that sought to impose huge portions of the JUA losses on the
insurers. The second alternative is to build the moneys taken by the special
assessment back into the rate base, so that the insurers would in effect be
allowed to price their product to recover a fair rate of return on the forced loans
to the state. It was just that position on which the current litigation in New
Jersey is now proceeding.62
This approach is plagued, I believe, with fatal difficulties. In principle, if
the system of rate regulation worked perfectly, then there should be no
difference in outcomes between the two approaches. The rate regulation system
would take into account the riskiness of the loans, and would ask whether or not
the increase in insurance rates that would have to be authorized could in practice
be recovered in the competitive market. The companies that paid today would
get their money back with interest tomorrow.
But the world is full of institutional imperfections, and when these are taken
into account, it is clear that adding the special assessments into the rate base is
a poor substitute remedy for not making the assessments at all. If New Jersey
could not make its special assessments and did not choose to levy taxes to cover
the JUA shortfall, then it could go to the capital markets. Those markets would
charge a rate of interest commensurate with the risks of the loan, which would
depend upon its term of repayment and the security offered by the state. New
Jersey would then have an incentive to obtain the best mix of low interest rates
and favorable credit terms, and the past transactions would be off the books.
The moment these special assessments are included in the rate base, any
independent assessment of their adequacy in the capital markets is necessarily
sacrificed. Now the Insurance Commission, itself an interested party, has to
determine the suitable rate of (risk adjusted) return, and to determine the set of
rates that are necessary to sustain that return. The problem here is by no means
an easy one if each company has a fixed obligation to pay some portion of the
special assessment, based solely on its past business within the state. Even if
high rates were authorized, there is no reason to believe that they would be
collected, given market pressures. The companies would have an incentive to
compete away the authorized gains, if (as discussed earlier with assigned risk
pools)' their obligations do not vary with the number of policies they write or
the premiums that they collect.
61. See discussion supra pp. 17-18.
62. This question was left open in State Fann Mut. Ins., slip op. at 8. The decision concluded:
"Therefore, there has to be a judicial hearing as to whether or not the plaintiff can get a fair rate
of return via an application for a rate increase when the surtax it must pay is excluded from the rate
base."
63. See supra pp. 12-13.
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But suppose that the rate increase could not be competed away. Even then
the proposed remedy is constitutionally defective. The rate of return offered
under the regulation operates as the "just compensation" for the capital that is
committed to the business. The relevant inquiry is, what is the likelihood that
a correct rate determination will be made by the political process? Here there
are three possible outcomes to the ratemaking determination: the state could set
the rates too high, or too low, or just right. If one thought that the errors in the
process were randomly distributed about the proper mean--the just rate of return-then there could be no principled objection to first adding the assessments into
the rate base, and then compensating insurers for their capital conscripted into
the state's business. The process would be a forced loan at the ideal market rate
of return.
Owing to the inherent features of the political process, however, the errors
of course will not be random. Take the possibilities in turn. New Jersey has
no reason to allow rates that permit excessive rates of return on the forced loan;
it would hardly expend resources to coerce a transaction from which it emerged
the net loser. It is cheaper for the state to go into the capital markets on its own
account, for it will obtain a lower interest rate and incur lower administrative
costs. So with the one possibility out, New Jersey, with due regard to the
welfare of its citizens, will either set rates just right or too low. But we can
rule out the second possibility as well, for if the state sets them just right then
the citizens of New Jersey will emerge the losers because they will have to pay
in addition to the interest charges on the debt, the heavy administrative costs
necessary to make this regulatory system work.
The only way therefore that New Jersey could come out ahead is for the
state to provide a below market rate of return for its forced loan. It follows
therefore that the regulatory process can at best yield outcomes that are equal
to those of having New Jersey go to the capital markets, but that it is far more
likely that it will use administrative delay and accounting wizardry to force down
the rates of return below the constitutionally permissible level. Since money is
fungible, the entire risk of systematic undercompensation could be avoided if
New Jersey were forced, as a constitutional matter, to go to the capital markets
to fund its own deficits. Since financial markets are always open, the courts
should strike down a statute that allows money to be put into the rate base to pay
off a past indebtedness. The incentives created by the regulatory structure will
lead to systematic confiscation that no court can fully detect or prevent. This
is not a case where the government power is invoked because private markets
are not available to the state to meet its needs. It is a case where government
regulation is invoked because the state does not like the message that it hears in
private markets.
I have said enough to indicate that the political pressures generated in the
attempt to gain control over the assigned risk markets are apt to lead to
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systematically undesirable results, for insurers and the public at large. It must
be stressed again, however, that any relaxation of the constitutional standards
used to create weaknesses in funding the assigned risk pool are not solely on a
concern of the insurance companies (and their multiple shareholders, including
state pension funds) that bear the brunt of the state regulation. The present
structure of takings law makes it difficult for any insurer to attack state
regulation on the grounds that it creates distorted incentives in the underlying
accident market. But nonetheless that precise effect takes place. The insistence
that insurance be provided to assigned risk drivers at below market rates will
result in a greater number of these drivers on the highway, with some
predictable increase in accident and mortality rates.' The longer the state is
able to extract a subsidy for the assigned risk pool, the greater the opportunities
for these more dangerous drivers to inflict harm upon the person and property
of other individuals.
The message should be clear. The distortions in the accident market go
hand in hand with the distortions that are generated in the political markets that
drive insurance regulation. Although the protection that is afforded to property
holders under the constitution is for their benefit, one should not ignore,
especially in this context, the close and intimate connection between the book of
business that they are forced to write and anticipated increases in the frequency
and severity of accidents that take place. Empirical evidence on this connection
is doubtless hard to get, but in theory the direction of the effects is clear and as
the size of the subsidy increases, so too should the magnitude of ensuing
distortions. As a matter of first principle, there is a necessary linkage between
the just compensation rule for regulatory takings and the efficient operation of
the tort system. Affording insurers protection against regulatory confiscation is
a good proxy for promoting the efficiency of the tort system. The system-wide
changes that place outside the tort system have far more to do with the level of
accidents that occur (I would hazard the guess) than any internal reformulation
of the tort (or no-fault) law' that governs the underlying situation. It is a

64. The exact extent of the loss is difficult to calculate. As a first approximation, the increase

in the percentage of high risk drivers should lead to an increase in the overall rate. That effect will
be compounded because the accident rates of everyone should increase, given the larger percentage
of poor drivers on the road. But the effects here will be reduced by some degree if the drivers who

are unable to obtain insurance through the assigned risk pool drive without insurance in violation
of state law. But given the criminal sanctions in place, at least some fraction of those drivers would
probably exit the market, and others might drive somewhat less often given their fear of sanctions.
Clearly any system of insurance regulation must be coupled with a set of sanctions against driving
without a license.
65. For a comparative look, note that one estimate of the possible rate of accident increase from
the automobile no-fault statutes placed it as high as 10 percent, see Landes, Insurance,Liability and
Accidents: A Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigation of the Effect of No-FaultAccidents, 25 J.L &
ECON. 49 (1982). Even if that estimate is high, an increase of the accident rate by 5 percent is still
serious business. The assigned risk pool subsidy appears to work a greater change in composition
of the driving pool than no-fault insurance, especially since no no-fault system has displaced the tort
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mistake to concentrate too closely on the details of accident law to identify the
determinants of accidents. The litigation of the assigned risk pool dominates the
overall situation.
California. The proper treatment of the assigned risk pool is also critical
for understanding the complex web of events in California. In order to
understand the full set of relationships, it is necessary first to summarize the
regulatory scheme in California under Proposition 103. Its central provisions
called for (1) an immediate, one time, one year 20 percent rollback in all rates
in the voluntary markets, and (2) implementing a general system of rate of
return regulation in insurance markets, and (3) powerful restrictions on
underwriting discretion. The first, contained in 1861.02, is directed to specific
weighting factors
(a) Rates and Premiums for an automobile insurance policy, as
described in subdivision (a) of Section 680, shall be determined by
application of the following factors in decreasing order of importance:
(1) The insured's driving safety record
(2) The number of miles he or she drives annually
(3) The number of years driving experience the insured has had.
(4) Such other factors as the commissioner may adopt by regulation
that have a substantial relationship to the risk of loss. The regulations
shall set forth the respective weight to be given each factor in
determining automobile rates and premiums. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the use of any criterion without such approval
shall constitute unfair discrimination....
In addition Proposition 103 contains a general section on discriminatory
rates that is tied into section 1861.02. Section 1861.05 provides:
No rate shall be approved or remain in effect which is excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. In considering whether a rate
is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, no consideration
shall be given to the degree of competition and the commissioner shall
consider whether the rate mathematically reflects the insurance
company's investment income.67
Proposition 103 thus structures the rating process so that only those
variables that fall within the "control" of the insured are taken into account in
setting rates. Nonetheless there are serious, indeed insuperable objections to this
rating system. First, the requirement that insurers use the specific factors in the

rules altogether.
66. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02 (West Supp. 1991).
67. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05 (West Supp. 1991).
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order listed, with additional factors to be added by administrative regulation,'
deviates from standard actuarial methods. Thus, the three factors that are
explicitly listed account for less of the total variation in accident behavior than
many of the factors that are kept off the list.' In addition, those factors which
have proved most probative in traditional pricing schemes -- territory, age,
gender and marital status -- have been explicitly repudiated by the Commissioner
under the discretion vested in her by Proposition 103.0
To make matters worse, Proposition 103 does not set the relative
importance of the stated factors. Instead it only indicates their rank order
significance. It is therefore an open question as to how mucb more important
1 is than 2 or 3 than 4. In addition, the priorities of the system are critically
dependent upon the number of factors that are taken into account in 4. If each
factor is weighted individually, then the priority system outlined by Proposition
103 can be undercut, for any close positive correlation between the separate
factors makes their impact largely duplicative. To deal with this problem, the
regulations under Proposition 103 take the other relevant factors into account on
a "tempered" basis, that is one, where their combined influence was kept to a
level lower of that of the third mandatory factor, even though it represented a
substantial deviation from usual cost-based actuarial methods. The net effect of
tempering the relevant cost variables has been to induce a rate increase in the
non-urban areas and a corresponding decrease in the urban areas, itself a
distortion of the underlying insurance markets. The Commissioner has taken the
position that since the purpose of Proposition 103 is to benefit all Californians,
the decreases should stand, but the increases should be disregarded.
Accordingly, she has adopted a two-part strategy that in effect "forbids

68. The Commissioner has added a list of 19 factors, including such things as make and model
of vehicle, its age, design characteristics, alterations, type of use, repair and medical rates, litigation
rates, population and vehicle density. See CAL. CODE REoS., tit. 10, § 2632.6(c) (1991) (containing
the complete list).
69. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.1 (1991). The Regulations refer to the results of a
three member panel organized by the Commissioner to examine the rate structure. Its conclusion
was as follows:
All three members agreed that the three Mandated Factors required by Proposition
103 were not necessarily those which would be the three dominant factors if the ratings
were made purely on a cost-based approach. Further, all three members agreed that it
was quite possible that one or more of the Optional Factors would, on a cost-based
approach, warrant a greater "weight" than one or even all three combined of the three
Mandated Factors. Based upon the evidence adduced in the hearings, the Commissioner
finds this result very likely.

Id.
70. See id. The explanation given is that territory should not be used because of the "public
resistance to "territory" as a simple "zip code" approach and to the potential for misuse of this
factor by insurers." The statement is odd in all its aspects. The simplicity of the factor makes it
more difficult to be a source of abuse, and reduces the cost of its administration. No explanation

was offered for the exclusion of sex, age or marital status either.
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substantial rate increases as a result of such tempering""' while simultaneously
endorsing the rate reductions that tempering will bring to urban areas.
Unfortunately, further difficulties take place in the effort to reconcile the
specific demands of §1861.02 with the more general injunction that is contained
in §1861.05. First, the very fact that the specific rating factors are accorded
excessive significance under §1861.02 suggests that this section is itself unfairly
discriminatory because it departs from the cost based rules mandated in
§1861.05. To follow the factors set out in §1861.02 is to violate §1861.05
because it necessarily requires that some individuals with lower risk receive
higher rates, and thus be subject to excessive rates, or unfairly discriminatory
rates, or both. The two sections are in hopeless tension with each other.
Second, even if that objection is dismissed (on the ground that the specific
trumps the general) the system, as applied, seems unfairly discriminatory
because it uses one method to calculate the urban rates and another to calculate
the nonurban rates. Urban rates are not subsidized by the nonurban ones under
the Commissioner's two tier structure. But someone still has to subsidize the
below market urban rates, and that only contender for that honor are the
insurance companies that operate in the urban territories. Yet they can only
make (at best) a competitive rate of return in the nonurban markets, where they
compete with local carriers that do not have an urban book of business. They
must therefore take large losses in the urban markets.
Given these constraints, it is most unclear how Proposition 103 allows
insurers to receive the constitutionally protected rate of return guaranteed by the
California Supreme Court's Calfarm decision, which threw out the mandatory
20 percent rollback for the 1988-1989 year. The Commissioner believes that it
is possible for an irresistible force to meet an immovable object, but in the
words of the song "something's got to give." There is no explanation as to how
Proposition 103 can be implemented in the voluntary market and do these four
things simultaneously: (a) reduce some rates, (b) hold other rates constant, (c)
increase the costs of administration, (d) guarantee insurers a just rate of return
on their invested capital. A massively inefficient system of regulation can make
everyone worse off and no one better off, but it cannot make someone better and
no one worse off.
But there is one further complication. Proposition 103 does not take into
account the operation of the assigned risk pool, which as noted traditionally has
been subsidized by the voluntary market. With proposition 103 in place, one
question that arises is whether the voluntary market can be obligated to continue
to subsidize the assigned risk pool. Judge Vogel, the trial judge in the

71. Id.
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Proposition 103 cases, held that the voluntary market could no longer subsidize
the assigned risk pool because to do so would be to require it to issue rates that
are both excessive and nondiscriminatory.' That decision has been challenged
by the Insurance Commissioner on Appeal.'
If the appeal loses, then the
question assigned risk pool will have to be placed on its own footing, in which
case the rates will have to increase dramatically, by well over 100 percent, to
cover the anticipated losses. If not, then the traditional mechanisms of
apportionment and assignment will have to take place in the voluntary market.
Yet as that market itself is tightly regulated, rates can no longer freely move up
to reflect the tied costs generated by the assigned risk pool. The Commissioner
therefore has taken the position that it is possible, both to deny any immediate
increases in the assigned risk pool and to keep the short term freeze on in the
voluntary market, here by promising only to take assigned risk losses into
account at some future time if rate increases are decreed there.74 Yet no one
in a voluntary market part with a dollar today on the strength of an unsecured
promise to reconsider matters at some time in the future. Yet the administrative
procedures continue forward on this (contested) footing.
The situation is in flux at every level, but as before the lesson must be
clear. The battles between the Insurance Commissioner and the insurance
companies has influence for the level and severity of accidents. By deciding to
ignore age, sex, marital status and territory, there is an implicit subsidy for the
most dangerous segments of the driving public by the least dangerous.
Voluntary markets are highly sensitive to differences in territory, age, sex and
marital status. To hold by general law that these must be ignored creates the
following situation. There are two classes of person A and B. The As can be
insured against a fixed class of risks for $1000, and the Bs for $2,000 because
of any of the aforementioned characteristics. If the insurer is told that it must
charge a single blended rate for As and Bs, say of $1,500, the consequences
should be clear. The A's will be in great demand, as insurers will stumble over
their feet in order to get them into their group (perhaps with promise for deluxe
service). The Bs will become orphans within their own time, especially when
new customers, for whom there can be no obligation to renew, apply for
insurance. 5 There will therefore have to be a steady stream of coercion

72. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gillespie, No. C744670 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1989).
73. The Commissioner's Brief on Appeal was filed in Mar., 1990.
74. Referring to the argument that the assigned risk pool losses cannot be recovered in the
voluntary market, the Commissioner's brief states: "These arguments should not be taken seriously
because the Commissioner has repeatedly pledged, through her counsel for insurers, that any
CAARP-rclated losses would be considered by the Commissioner in setting an individual insurer's
fair rate of return." Brief of Appellant, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gillespie, No. B 047071 (Cal. Ct. App.
filed Dec. 21, 1989).
75. In practice the new business problem is even greater, because it applies not only to new
customers who seek coverage, but also to existing customers who required changed coverage, say
because a family member is added to or removed from a policy, or because of a change in car and
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imposed upon the insurers to see that they take losing risks.
The same general lessons about regulation must be learned anew. A
subsidy will not result in simple cash transfers, but will also change the mix of
drivers on the road, from less to more dangerous. Owing to the powerful
effects of the laws of large numbers, it is clear that the accident rates will
change as well. Similarly the decision to underprice insurance in the assigned
risk pool will compound the errors in the (once) voluntary market for the same
reason. The ostensible end of these regulations is to control rates, and to protect
the "working poor" who could not pay higher rates. But the costly and
contentious statutory initiatives have had the same effect that they have had in
New Jersey. They lead to a deterioration of market controls against accident
rates.
Major distributional initiatives always have undesirable allocative
consequences.
There is of course a case for regulation where the regulated industry is a
natural monopoly, for now the risks of excessive pricing (and the distortions it
creates) may justify an effort to keep prices back at the competitive level. But
the insurance industry is not a natural monopoly, so that the "enormous
increases" in insurance rates cannot be attributable to monopoly pricing, but to
underlying cost factors that are always at work.7' It hardly does to say that
there is a "crisis" because the rate of premium increases is above that of the rate
of inflation: some variation of prices is inevitable even in an inflation-free
economy and must be expected here. If tort damages continue to rise above the
level of inflation, then the costs of insurance will follow suit. If traffic becomes
more congested, cars smaller, and drivers worse, there are other reasons to
expect a deterioration in the underlying primary activity. As a constitutional
matter, the entire system of regulation should be swept away on its face, for
there is no way that a regulated competitive firm can obtain just compensation
if it cannot earn a competitive rate of return on equity.
But whatever the present constitutional law on this tangled subject, the
invitation to regulate in this fashion should be resisted not only for the factional
strife that it creates, but for the way in which it upsets the fragile
accommodation between tort law and insurance that has existed over the
generations. Most automobile accident cases are easy to decide on liability.
What matters therefore most are not doctrinal refinements, but basic institutions.
The most recent round of insurance reform has waved all the familiar populist
banners. But in design and implementation it has been destructive of the
salutory features that traditional rules in tort and insurance could generate.

address. The system of regulation works at the aggregate level and does a poor job in responding
to these individual problems of risk.
76. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1990 at 50, col. 4 (Insurance company insolvencies are increasing
because insurance companies are subject to the effects of the economy.).
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